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Migration to and from Scotland might be affected
by the outcome of the 2014 Scottish referendumon
the constitutional future of the United Kingdom.
This potential change in migration has not been
thoroughly analysed to date. The aim of this paper
is thus to present a set of predictions of the
possible effects of Scottish independence on
internal and international migration. In particular,
different sources of uncertainty of futuremigration
ﬂows are examined. The presented forecasts are
based on the available historical data onmigration
ﬂows, as well as on the opinions of a panel of
experts on future migration trends. Bayesian
statistical inference is used to combine different
sources of uncertainty in a coherent manner. The
results indicate that there is substantial uncertainty
about future migration to and from Scotland,
which increases with the forecast horizon. The
most uncertain ﬂow is international immigration
to Scotland. Emigration from Scotland is more
likely than not to increase in the near future,
whereasmigration between Scotland and the rest
of the UK is expected to remain at similar levels
to the present, irrespective of the outcome of
the 2014 independence referendum. © 2014 The
Authors. Population, Space and Place Published
by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.Accepted 22 March 2014
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I n the context of the 2014 Scottish referendumon the constitutional future of the UnitedKingdom (UK), the aim of this paper is to
forecast how Scottish independence might
impact migration in Scotland, both within the
boundaries of the current UK, as well as interna-
tionally. Four migration ﬂows concerning
Scotland are considered: in-migration from and
out-migration to the rest of the UK, as well as
immigration from and emigration to all other
countries. The presented forecasts of migration
are based on two key sources: the historical
statistical data on Scottish migration and a
Delphi survey amongst 12 experts, concerning
the future migration trends. The forecasts, with
a horizon of 2021, demonstrate the high uncer-
tainty of future Scottish migration. Selected
results of the Delphi survey are also discussed.
Migration is the most uncertain – and barely
predictable – component of the population
change; hence, forecasting it requires a careful
assessment of the uncertainty (e.g. Bijak, 2010;
Bijak & Wiśniowski, 2010; Abel et al., 2013). The
uncertainty of migration predictions comes from
several sources. First, unlike in the case of vital
events, the concepts and deﬁnitions of a migration
and of a migrant are vague and do not allow for
efﬁcient measurement (Poulain et al., 2006;
Kupiszewska & Nowok, 2008; Raymer et al.,
2013; Wiśniowski et al., 2013). Second, while the
reasons for migration can vary greatly amongst
migrants, the existing theoretical explanations
are too speciﬁc and too fragmented to be helpful
in predicting migration. Finally, migration itself
is susceptible to many unpredictable factors, such
as political and economic crises or policy changes
(Bijak, 2010).ttribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction
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of migration are required for informed policy-
making, as well as for understanding reasons
and consequences of migration (e.g. Alho &
Spencer, 1985, 2005; Bijak, 2010). This information
is especially vital before the Scottish independence
referendum that is scheduled on 18 September
2014. Depending on the outcome of this referen-
dum, Scottish Government’s policy towards
migration may diverge to a greater or lesser extent
from the policy currently implemented by the
government of the entire UK.
This paper makes three main contributions to
the debate on the impact of possible constitu-
tional change in the UK on Scottish migration.
First, an explicit analysis of the uncertainty
associated with migration forecasts is offered in
terms of probability distributions, which goes
beyond the standard variant approach used by
the ofﬁcial statistics. Second, the assessment of
the uncertainty utilises historical data, as well as
formally elicited quantiﬁable expert opinion.
Third, forecasts of migration processes, and of
the result of the Scottish independence referen-
dum, the latter based on a series of opinion poll
data, are combined in a bespoke manner in a
unique and topical area of application.
In terms of methodology, and especially with
respect to the coherent quantiﬁcation of uncer-
tainty, the work presented in this paper is based
on Bayesian statistics. The essence of Bayesian
inference, based on joint probability distributions
of all random quantities under study, is that it
offers a natural framework for incorporating
various sources of uncertainty in forecasts. These
sources may include the following: natural
variability of the process under study, measure-
ment errors, uncertainty about the forecasting
model and its parameters, ambiguities of the
expert opinion, and the inevitable and irreducible
uncertainty of the future (Bijak, 2010; Bijak &
Wiśniowski, 2010; Gelman et al., 2013).
This paper is structured as follows. In the next
section, the background of the study is described,
with a focus on two aspects: a brief summary of
the current political debate on migration in
Scotland, followed by a discussion of problems
related to migration measurement in the policy
context. In the section on Methodology, the
forecasting method is presented, including a dis-
cussion of the Delphi study amongst experts on
future migration in Scotland. In the section on© 2014 The Authors. Population, Space and Place published by John WileyResults, the forecasts of Scottish migration are
reported. Lastly, the section on Discussion and
policy implications offers a summary of ﬁndings
and recommendations for policymakers.BACKGROUND
Constitutional Context
Following the re-establishment of a Scottish
Parliament in 1997, some of the political control
has been repatriated from London to Edinburgh.
Scotland now has the power to make laws in so-
called Devolved Matters, such as education,
justice, health, economic development, or internal
transport. On the other hand, responsibility for
the Reserved Matters rests with the Parliament
of the UK in Westminster. The Reserved Matters
include, amongst others, defence, foreign policy,
beneﬁts, oil, gas and electricity, and immigration
(Scottish Parliament, 2014).
The 2014 independence referendum will ask
Scottish residents whether Scotland should be
an independent country. As set out in the Scottish
Government (2013) White Paper Scotland’s
Future, if the majority of voters answer positively,
from 24 March 2016, Scotland will be able to
decide about all Reserved Matters, while the
monarch of the UK will remain the head of state.
Being an important element of the Reserved
Matters, the migration policy for Scotland is
decided centrally in Westminster for the entire
UK. According to the Scottish Government
(2013), immigration policy of the UK Govern-
ment is too restrictive and thus hampers popula-
tion and economic growth in Scotland. For
example, since the late 1990s, there was a steady
increase in immigration from overseas and
decline in out-migration to the rest of the UK.
However, in 2012, the net migration ﬂow to
Scotland dropped from 27,000 to 12,700 persons,
which was a result of an increase in emigration
overseas and reduction of immigration. Details
on the differences between the UK and Scottish
Government policy stance on migration, and
between the public attitudes to immigration in
Scotland and elsewhere in the UK, are discussed
in McCollum et al. (2014).
In Scotland, migration is a very important
component of the overall population growth
(NRS, 2014). The issues of population ageing& Sons Ltd Popul. Space Place 20, 455–464 (2014)
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working age groups, are on top of the Scottish
Government’s agenda and at the core of their
economic strategy (Wilson & Rees, 2003; Rolfe &
Metcalf, 2009). Currently, there is an ofﬁcial target
for population growth in Scotland, which is
envisaged to match that of the EU 15 countries
by 2017 (Scottish Government, 2013: 140).
Migration is clearly one of the key variables that
have impact on the population growth target.
Still, the key component of Scottish migration is
related to ﬂows to and from the rest of the UK,
with levels of international migration being of
slightly lower magnitude.Migration Measurement Issues
Generally, measurement of migration in Scotland,
as well as in the entire UK, is difﬁcult because of
the limitations of the data collection mechanisms
used. Information on international migration is
obtained from the International Passenger Survey
(IPS), whereas the data on internal migration
come from the National Health Service Central
Register of patients. While the former can be
inadequate because of the sampling and non-
sampling errors of the survey, the latter can be
biased by the under-registration or delayed
registration of migrants (Singleton et al., 2010;
Raymer et al., 2011, 2012). As is acknowledged
by Rolfe and Metcalf (2009), these limitations
pose a serious obstacle for preparing population
estimates and projections, which serve as the
evidence base for policymaking.
The population estimates and projections for
Scotland are prepared by the National Records
of Scotland (NRS). The projections are scenario
based, that is, various assumptions are made
about the future mortality rates, fertility rates,
and net migration volumes, which are subse-
quently used as input in the cohort-component
model of population dynamics (NRS, 2014).
There is a principal (base) scenario, as well as
low and high variants for each of the three
components of population change. The base
scenario is interpreted as reﬂecting a likely and
plausible trajectory of the future population
change, whereas the low and high ones corre-
spond to some realistic lower and upper bounds.
For net migration, the levels are assumed to
converge to +7,000 (low variant), +15,500 (base
variant), or +24,000 (high variant) by mid-2018© 2014 The Authors. Population, Space and Place published by John Wileyand remain constant thereafter. Additional
scenarios explore effects of changes in the compo-
nents on the projection outcomes, for example, by
assuming zero net migration.
The ofﬁcial projections prepared by the NRS
suffer from two major shortcomings: (a) there is
no speciﬁcation or assessment of the likelihood
of any of the scenarios, and (b) the assumptions
relate to net migration, rather than separately to
inﬂows and outﬂows. This approach is known
to conﬂate the ﬂows in both directions, which
may be largely independent from each other,
and to obscure the resulting age distributions
(Rogers, 1990). While in this paper the overall
methodology of population projections is not
addressed, the proposed method allows for
overcoming these two limitations. In particular,
by forecasting the international, as well as
intra-UKmigration ﬂows separately, the method
is capable of surmounting the shortcomings of
the net migration approach. Moreover, the
suggested methodology is also capable of
integrating various sources of uncertainty in
the forecasts and explicitly describing the future
migration in probabilistic terms.METHODOLOGY
Expert Knowledge Elicitation
As mentioned in the Introduction, the forecasts of
Scottish migration are based on several pieces of
information. The ﬁrst one – expert opinion – has
been obtained by means of a two-round Delphi
survey (e.g. Armstrong, 1985; Rowe & Wright,
1999, 2001). The survey has been carried out
between June and August 2013, amongst 12
migration experts. It was aided by an online
Multidisciplinary Assessment of Technology
Centre for Healthcare (MATCH) Uncertainty
Elicitation Tool (Morris et al., 2014). The question-
naire was designed following the general advice
on elicitation given by Kadane and Wolfson
(1998), O’Hagan (1998), and O’Hagan et al.
(2006), as well as recent applications of the Delphi
survey for migration modelling and forecasting in
Bijak and Wiśniowski (2010), Abel et al. (2013),
Raymer et al. (2013), and Wiśniowski et al. (2013).
The questionnaire used in this work consisted
of a preamble, which introduced the project aims
and explained elicitation methodology, followed
by ﬁve speciﬁc questions and an open question& Sons Ltd Popul. Space Place 20, 455–464 (2014)
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respondents. The ﬁrst question was related to
the subjective probability of gaining indepen-
dence by Scotland. The next question related to
in-migration from the rest of the UK to Scotland
in two scenarios: gaining independence or
remaining in the UK. The experts were asked
to state if the selected components of migration
(i.e. students, young workers, families with
children, and retirees) would increase, decrease,
or remain at the same level, and invited to ‘bet’
on the level of the total number of migrants in
2021 for each of the scenarios, by using the
online elicitation tool. ‘Betting’ consisted in
placing a desired number of ‘chips’ on a given
range of the level of future migration. Experts
were also informed about the level of migration
observed in 2011.
The next three questions on, respectively, out-
migration from Scotland to the rest of the UK,
international immigration to Scotland, and
international emigration out of Scotland were
constructed in a similar fashion. The ‘bets’ on
the level of migration were further transformed
into the probability distributions for the
expected levels of migration in 2021, by using
the built-in features within the MATCH elicita-
tion tool. In general, online betting proved to
provide a very efﬁcient and intuitive way of
eliciting the uncertainty of experts about the
future levels of migration. The two-round design
of the survey allowed for a possibility of conver-
gence of the views of particular experts. How-
ever, this largely did not take place in the study.Bayesian Time Series Forecasting
The forecasts of migration ﬂows are based on a
combination of expert knowledge and statistical
trend data, brought together under a common
Bayesian framework for forecasting and describ-
ing the associated uncertainty. To produce the
forecasts, annual, historical, and ofﬁcially reported
end-of-year data on migration from 1975 to 2011
have been used. The data were obtained from
the National Records of Scotland and
supplemented by information from the Ofﬁce for
National Statistics for the rest of the UK. The data
series are presented in Figures 2 and 3 in the
section on Results, alongside the forecasts. The
results from the forecasting model should be© 2014 The Authors. Population, Space and Place published by John Wileyanalysed bearing in mind the shortcomings of
the data discussed in the section on Background.
The forecasting model has been constructed
similarly as in Abel et al. (2013), following the
methodological work by Bijak (2010) and Bijak
andWiśniowski (2010). First, expert views related
to the level of migration in the forecast horizon
year H= 2021 have been transformed into the
prior distribution in the following ways. Let the
level of expected migration in 2021 be denoted
by ν, which is obtained as a mixture probability
distribution over all experts, i= 1, … , n, for
n= 12. For each expert i, a log-normal distribution
fi(ν) has been constructed using the results
obtained from the online MATCH elicitation tool.
Subsequently, the individual densities have been
combined into a single prior distribution, π:
π vð Þ ¼ 1
n
∑ni¼1 f i vð Þ: (1)
Further, let yt, t= 1975, … , T, where T= 2011,
denote a natural logarithm of a given migration
ﬂow in year t. To produce forecasts, a simple
autoregressive model of order 1 has been used,
whereby




for t ¼ 1976;…;T




for t ¼ T þ 1;…;H
φeN 0; 0:1ð Þ; μeN 0; 0:0001ð Þ;
τeN 0; 0:0001ð ÞI τ > 0ð Þ:
In the previously mentioned speciﬁcation, μ is
a mean of the ﬂow (on a logarithmic scale), φ is an
autoregressive parameter, τ is a precision (inverse
of a variance), and the notation I(τ> 0) represents
a probability distribution that has been truncated
to include positive values only. The precision
parameter reﬂects the variability of the data yt,
t= 1975, … , T, which is propagated in the fore-
casts for t=T+ 1, … , H, where H= 2021 is the
forecast horizon. This uncertainty is distinct from
the uncertainty about the expected level of migra-
tion in 2021 expressed by the experts and
reﬂected by the prior density in Equation (1).
The uncertainty of the resulting forecasts has
to include uncertainty embedded in the historical
data, uncertainty of the experts about future
migration, and the uncertainty about possible
outcomes of the 2014 independence referendum
and its impact on migration. In order to reﬂect
that in an appropriate manner, the forecasts and
(2)& Sons Ltd Popul. Space Place 20, 455–464 (2014)
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ous scenarios. The hierarchy of scenarios for all
four directions of ﬂows is presented in Figure 1.
For each of the ﬂows, two mutually exclusive
scenarios have been considered:
(i) Scotland does not gain independence and the
constitutional status quo remains, or
(ii) Scotland gains independence.
Further, for the independence scenario, four
different paths of expected migration ﬂows
have been proposed:
(a) gradual change from the current level to the
level foreseen by the experts;
(b) a sudden change to expected levels in 2016 – the
year of actual gaining of independence
according to the White Paper Scotland’s Future
(Scottish Government, 2013);
(c) a gradual change towards the expected 2021
levels, starting from 2016; and
(d) gradual change right from the referendum year
(2014).
These scenarios are represented by different
speciﬁcations of the μ* parameter in
Equation (2).
Because the likelihoods for all averaged models
are exactly the same and there is no strong prior
information about which variant path (a–d) is
more plausible, the posterior weights have been
assumed equal for all of them. The two main
scenarios, in turn, have been weighted by the pre-
dicted probability of particular referendum out-
comes, with two mutually exclusive possibilities:
independence (with probability p) and remaining
in the UK (with probability 1 – p). The referendumFigure 1. Conceptual framework
© 2014 The Authors. Population, Space and Place published by John Wileypredictions were obtained from combining the
expert survey with the results of various opinion
polls carried out in 2013, disregarding the
‘unknown’ or ‘undecided’ answers.
For the logit-transformed share of the poll
respondents who declared voting for the inde-
pendence, an autoregressive model has been
constructed. The results of the poll were obtained
from the UK Polling Report website.1 The use of
prediction market data has also been considered,
but the best-suited market, which used to trade in
contracts related to the Scottish independence,
Intrade.com, stopped trading in March 2013, which
would render the relevant data too outdated.
The subjective opinion elicited from the experts
was used only as prior information, which subse-
quently was modiﬁed by the available historical
data on migration and the results of the opinion
polls. The prior input has been especially impor-
tant in averaging of the forecasts uncertainty, as
the outcome of the referendum remains unknown
up to date. However, migration data play a key
role in shaping the uncertainty of future migration
trends, which has proved to bemuchmore inﬂuen-
tial than the referendum result. Prior distributions
for the remaining model parameters (i.e. μ, φ,
and τ) are very weakly informative and have
hardly any impact on the posterior distributions.
RESULTS
The results of the Delphi survey indicate that the
impact of Scottish independence on migration
may largely depend on the group of migrants in
question, with the migration of students and
young workers being potentially the mostof the scenarios hierarchy.
& Sons Ltd Popul. Space Place 20, 455–464 (2014)
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directions of the expert answers for particular
migration ﬂows, migrant groups under the two
scenarios, are summarised in Table 1.
The expert answers revealed relatively higher
uncertainty – and a wider spread of views – under
the scenario of Scottish independence. The subjec-
tive probabilities of independence were also
obtained from the panel of experts. Here, the major-
ity of the panel felt that there was a rather small
likelihood of full Scottish sovereignty being
achieved following the referendum. In general, the
expert uncertainty about future migration has been
found to be a crucial component of the overall fore-
cast errors. Fuller details of the Delphi survey
amongst experts can be found in Shang et al. (2014).
The forecasts of the four directions of Scottish
migration are shown in Figure 2, separately for
the two scenarios: status quo (left column) and in-
dependence (right column). In general, the fore-
casts seem to be moderately sensitive to the
expert information about the potential impact of
the referendum outcome. More substantial differ-
ences can be noticed for in-migration from the
rest of the UK to Scotland (panel A in Figure 2)
and emigration from Scotland to the rest of the
world (panel D in Figure 2). The averaged fore-
casts for the four directions of ﬂows, weighted
by the predicted probability of independence,
are, in turn, presented in Figure 3. They take into
account the historical data, expert opinion on the
level of migration in 2021, and the uncertainty



















Notes: ‘↓’ denotes that a majority of experts expect a migration component to
that the experts were undecided. Source: Shang et al. (2014).
© 2014 The Authors. Population, Space and Place published by John Wileyuncertainty of forecasts presented in Figure 3 is
thus weighted across both scenarios – status quo
and independence – and, for the latter, across
the four assumed variant paths.
For in-migration from the rest of the UK to
Scotland, the results suggest that it will generally
remain at similar levels as observed in the past.
The uncertainty of the forecasts indicates that this
migration ﬂow is more likely to decrease than
increase, which seems to be even more plausible
under the independence scenario. As far as out-
migration from Scotland to the rest of the UK is
concerned, it is expected that it will also remain
at similar levels to those observed in the 1990s
and 2000s, although with a slight tendency to
increase. Here, it is also expected that the out-
come of the independence referendum will have
hardly any impact on the level of ﬂows.
Immigration ﬂows to Scotland from the rest of the
world are characterised by substantial uncertainty.
On average, however, future immigration is likely
to remain at similar levels to those observed in the
2000s. Nevertheless, there exists a non-negligible
probability of large inﬂows. Further, immigration
from overseas does not seem to be much affected
by the referendum outcome. This ﬁnding is likely
due to the fact that the effect of the referendum
has been largely subsumed within the generally
high unpredictability for this direction of ﬂows.
Finally, for emigration ﬂows from Scotland to
the rest of the world, the referendum outcome is
not expected to be a major driver of mobility. It
is forecasted, although, that emigration ﬂows willion components.







↑ ↓ ~ ↓ ↑/~
~ ? ~ ↓ ~
~ ↓ ~ ↑ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
decrease, ‘↑’ – to increase, ‘~’ – to remain unchanged, and ‘?’ indicates
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A) In-migration from the rest of the UK to Scotland, data for 1975–2011 (solid line)  
and forecasts for 2012–2021 (grey shadings), in thousands  
B) Out-migration from Scotland to the rest of the UK, data for 1975–2011 (solid line)  
and forecasts for 2012–2021 (grey shadings), in thousands  
C) Immigration from the rest of the world to Scotland, data for 1975–2011 (solid line)   
and forecasts for 2012–2021 (grey shadings), in thousands  
D) Emigration from Scotland to the rest of the world, data for 1975–2011 (solid line)   
and forecasts for 2012–2021 (grey shadings), in thousands  
Source: own computations; migration data from the ONS and NRS  
Note: Grey lines in the forecasts represent deciles (0.1 probability bands) of the uncertainty of predictions, 
and the shades of grey represent plausibility of a given migration path to fall into a given range– the lighter 
the colour, the less plausible a given path is.   
Figure 2. Forecasts of Scottish migration under two scenarios: status quo (left column) and independence
(right column).
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(grey shadings), in thousands.
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pared with the historically observed levels.
DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The predictions of Scottish migration presented
in this paper are based on the results of the
Bayesian forecasting model and take into account
the available historical data, expert views, and
predictions of the outcome of the referendum on
independence, based on the opinion poll data.
The analysis reveals high uncertainty about both
internal and international migration in Scotland.
On the one hand, as discussed in McCollum
et al. (2014), independent Scotland may try to
attract more migrants from abroad. On the other
hand, the inﬂow will likely be balanced by an
increase in emigration. Migration exchange with
the rest of the UK is expected to remain at similar
levels as those observed in the past two decades.
This last ﬁnding can be explained by the fact
that, according to the Scottish Government
(2013: 14), Scotland is expected to remain in the
Common Travel Area (CTA) with the rest of the
UK. Then, the agreements about travelling with-
out systematic passport and immigration control
between Scotland and the rest of the UK will
remain intact. However, this may lead to a© 2014 The Authors. Population, Space and Place published by John Wileysituation when Scotland is used as a ‘backdoor’
to the rest of the UK by those migrants, whose
direct entry is limited. For this reason, even in
the case of independence, new Scottish immigra-
tion policy may not diverge greatly from the
current rather restrictive approach implemented
by the UK Government.
Still, since the Scottish Government, in its
White Paper on Scotland’s Future, has identiﬁed
immigration as one of the key drivers of popula-
tion and economic growth, the considerations
explored in this paper are clearly important for
decision-making surrounding migration policy.
If constitutional change allows the Scottish
Government to set up and implement its own
migration policy, it is expected to follow a less-
restrictive approach to immigration than the
current UK policy. However, this policy would
plausibly have to take into account the views of
the UK Government and its own approach
towards immigrants, mainly because of the CTA
arrangements (for further discussion, refer to
Meehan, 2014).
In terms of the forecasting methodology, the
main contribution of this paper is twofold. First,
the forecasting method integrates uncertainty
from the data, expert views, and various scenar-
ios of future migration depending on the& Sons Ltd Popul. Space Place 20, 455–464 (2014)
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approach is recommended as an alternative to
the ofﬁcial scenario-based projections, as whole
probability distributions offer the forecast users
more information in comparison to variant
scenarios. Second, it has been demonstrated that
a Delphi survey, aided by online elicitation tools,
can be utilised to obtain useful information on the
expert uncertainty concerning future migration
ﬂows. The MATCH elicitation tool (Morris et al.,
2014) has proven to be very helpful in quantify-
ing the expert uncertainty, although some experts
initially required additional explanation of the
‘betting’ method. In that respect, for future
applications, it is also recommended that more
emphasis is put on eliciting the explanations
and justiﬁcations for the views expressed in
quantitative terms. It needs to be stressed that
the results of the survey are not used in the fore-
casting process on their own but are used within
the Bayesian approach to augment the available
quantitative data.
More general challenges that remain open to
future research include disaggregating ﬂows by
the broad group of origin countries (such as EU
and non-EU), or by age and sex, and investigat-
ing how the outcome of the referendum may
impact these speciﬁc groups. However, what
may obstruct the analysis is the high sampling
error in the disaggregated data originating from
the IPS. Here, a solution could be using alterna-
tive sources of data, such as in the Integrated
Model for European Migration project (Raymer
et al., 2013; Wiśniowski, 2013). Moreover,
forecasting disaggregated variables would plau-
sibly require detailed subjective opinion, about
which experts might be very uncertain. Another
option is to explore a broader class of forecasting
models and carry out Bayesian model averaging
for them (Bijak, 2010; Abel et al., 2013).
The limitations and possibilities for further
research notwithstanding, the key lesson from
the current piece of work is that the potential
impact of the constitutional change on Scottish
migration is not of primary importance for the
future migration ﬂows into and out of Scotland.
When compared with the overall forecasting
uncertainty of the underlying migration pro-
cesses, the uncertainty of the referendum result
did not prove to be very consequential. Hence,
irrespective of the referendum outcome, any
political and policy strategies and decisions© 2014 The Authors. Population, Space and Place published by John Wileydealing with the future of Scottish migration will
need to take the large uncertainty of migration
forecasts into account.
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